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The Common Security and Defence Policy in a State of Flux? The Case of Libya 
in 2011 
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Abstract: This article focuses on the European Union’s reaction to the Libyan 
crisis in 2011 as a case study. It seeks to demonstrate the limitations of the 
‘strategic culture approach’ in observing and explaining the EU’s lack of a 
common response, which would have involved the development of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and to demonstrate that the ‘domestic level 
approach’ has greater explanatory power. It lays emphasis on France, Britain, 
Italy and Germany as a sample of the EU/27. The empirical material includes 
several interviews.  
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Introduction  
The European Union’s reaction to the 2011 Libyan ‘crisis’ is a relevant issue to 
observe for its implications for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It 
throws a shadow across the future of the CSDP. This article’s task is to demonstrate 
the limitations of the ‘strategic culture approach’ in observing and explaining the 
EU’s lack of a common response, which would have involved the development of the 
CSDP, and to demonstrate that the ‘domestic level approach’ has greater explanatory 
power. As such, this article may make a novel contribution to the existing literature in 
the field.   
 
When, in February 2011, violence erupted in Libya, with Gaddafi’s use of force 
against civilians, collective action became necessary to stop it. A crisis management 
mission, the Unified Protector Operation, was launched by NATO, on 31 March, 
according to UNSC Resolution 1973. France, Britain and the US, with the support of 
American airpower and the Arab and European allies, participated in collective 
action, a coalition of the willing, with the US later withdrawing from the operation. 
There was no crisis management intervention by the EU/Common Security and 
Defence Policy. The EU member states could have taken the initiative within the 
framework of the European Union instead of leaving this to NATO. After a decade of 
rapid development in terms of structures and deployment, the CSDP could have been 
operational in Libya.  
 
A response by the EU would have determined the growth of the CSDP. The 
development of the Common Security and Defence Policy implied the formation of 
policy convergence. The latter did not require all of the member states to be 
operational. A reduced number, such as those willing to intervene, was sufficient to 
set the CSDP in motion. The political support of all of the EU states was however 
necessary to activate the initiative.  
 
This article’s discussion of the concepts regarding the strategic culture approach 
and the domestic level approach will involve explaining their defining features and 
reviewing the existing literature in the field. The empirical discussion, then, shall 
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evaluate the evidence regarding the EU’s lack of a common response to the Libyan 
crisis in terms of these two approaches. Based on this analysis, the article will 
disclose whether these approaches are suitable for analysing the development of the 
CSDP. The concluding remarks highlight certain ‘missed opportunities’ to enhance 
the future of the CSDP, and comment on whether the EU’s response to Libya suggests 
a particular trend.   
 
This article selects a few member states as a sample of the EU/27 to test the two 
approaches. France and Britain were an obvious choice due to their generally 
accepted leadership role within the context of security and defence. For the period 
2011-2012, Germany joined the first two at the UN Security Council, as a non-
permanent member, thus assuming a responsibility similar to that of France and the 
UK vis-à-vis the situation in Libya. Italy has recently acquired a new sense of 
responsibility regarding the governance of regional crises (Marchi 2013, 7), with 
personnel participating in several operations abroad. 
 
This article avails itself of various sources: official documents from the UNSC, the 
European Union, and the governments of the member states, EU officials and prime 
ministers’ speeches, parliamentary debates, specialised press on the EU (European 
Voice), specialised journals, newspapers (New York Times, Financial Times, The 
Guardian, Das Spiegel) and European magazines (The Economist), and a few 
secondary sources. Of the interviews conducted in Rome, Lyon, Cardiff, Oxford, 
London and Brussels, all have influenced the overall discussion in this case study. 
Interviews with senior officials from EU External Action also contributed as a source. 
All interviewees remain anonymous and their identity confidential.  
 
The methodology  
 
The strategic culture approach  
‘Policy convergence’ was necessary for the development of the CSDP, as it would 
have occurred if the EU had been active in Libya with a military operation. 
‘Convergence’ concerning the policies of the member states can be considered the 
process resulting from the combined effects of the mechanisms that are perceived in a 
similar way by these states. Within the area of security and defence, the mechanisms 
are the reactions to the security threat posed by an external challenge, the Libyan 
crisis. Considering the defining features of this approach, as other scholars engaged in 
‘strategic culture’ analysis have observed (Meyer 2004, Howorth 2004, Martinsen 
2004), these mechanisms of reaction to threats are based on the ideas, norms and 
patterns of behaviour of the actors involved in the security and defence policy. 
‘Culture’ in this field of study can be referred to as the background created by the 
values, traditions and beliefs of a nation, while ‘strategic culture’ can be considered 
the culture that sees it as necessary to support a military and civilian action that might 
be required to deal with an external threat.  
 
In the context of the EU/CSDP, strategic culture is the combination of ‘ideas, 
norms and patterns of behaviour that are sufficiently shared at the national level by 
political actors and society, and are related to processes concerning European security 
and defence politics’ (Martinsen’s and Meyer’s contributions). This definition is 
inclusive of society because it expands the idea of the ‘political actor’ to incorporate 
‘social actors’.  
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To deal with the question of the convergence of strategic cultures, and possibly 
towards a shared position in the EU/CSDP, several suggestions have been made. Its 
assumptions are that strategic culture (as defined above) needs to be shared at the EU 
level by member states in order to develop the CSDP (these assumptions thus 
becoming: the ‘ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour, related to the processes 
concerning the European security and defence politics, which are satisfactorily shared 
at the national level (by political actors and society), are to be satisfactorily shared at 
the EU level in order to offer convergence in the CSDP).     
 
Considering the assumptions of this approach (in terms of statements and norms 
which could be applied to the development of the CSDP), the ideas relate to the 
state’s role in the world and its vision of a safe global order. This understanding 
matters because the state’s vision of a safe and global order forms the basis for how it 
perceives any cooperation with other partners.  
 
Norms define the conditions under which employing force is lawful, and describe 
its purpose and the procedures for obtaining consent, both in the national and 
international contexts. The circumstances that legally allow the deployment and the 
motivations, as well as the mechanisms for gaining approval for engaging forces, are 
not necessarily the same for all EU member states. Norms play a substantial part in 
explaining deployment within the CSDP.  
 
Established patterns of behaviour can be largely seen as the way in which societies 
debate, the political actors take decisions, and the armed forces perform actions, all of 
which functions are related to security and defence (see Meyer 2004; Martinsen 
2004). An established pattern of behaviour could be the accepted convention, within a 
certain society, that military and civilian operations are conducted only in a 
multilateral setting, or by contrast could be led by individual states. Many kinds of 
collective framework are operational, i.e. the UN, NATO and OSCE, the coalition of 
the willing and others. A member state may prefer to use the EU framework, as far as 
possible, to guide these operations, if its society and the incumbent political leaders 
may opt to use the CSDP for security and defence matters.  
 
A further assumption of this approach relevant to this article suggests that an 
influential factor facilitating the development of a common strategic culture, and 
particularly its convergence in a shared position in the EU/CSDP, is the contribution 
of strong leadership at both the national and European Union levels (Giegerich 2006, 
13).  
 
The contribution of the literature  
There exists a significant body of studies on strategic culture. Some research centres 
in particular on the European Union and its structures. What is the key argument of 
these works?  
 
Defining strategic culture as ‘the institutional confidence and processes to manage 
and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective 
policy instruments’, this contribution (Cornish and Edwards 2001) explored one issue 
in particular. It questioned whether there has been a change, within the EU, to consent 
to the Union having (or developing) something similar to a strategic culture. Arguing 
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that the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) demands a 
corresponding ‘construction of the basic elements of a European security culture’, this 
other contribution (Howorth 2002) maintains that such a construction must reduce the 
‘diversity’ of the patterns and approaches of the EU member states.  
 
Another work (Howorth 2004) investigated how political elites have constructed a 
radically new discourse on European security; the role, in that construction, of ideas, 
epistemic communities, and advocacy coalitions, and the interplay of inter-subjective 
norms, values and identities; and how these ‘ideational’ dynamics have interacted 
with the apparently continuing interests of the nation-states. 
 
Further research focused on the ‘dynamics and scope’ of strategic culture-building 
in the context of the EU’s aspirations to develop a common security and defence 
policy; claimed that strategic culture is valuable in judging the environment within 
which the CSDP works (Meyer 2004, 2005, 2006); described the term ‘strategy’ as 
the ‘civil and military means employed in ranked order’ to reach specific ends defined 
as ‘crisis management’ (Martinsen 2004); and examined the character and potential of 
the EU as a strategic actor, by setting the investigation in the framework of the 
strategic culture debate (Cornish and Edwards 2005).   
 
Other contributions explained strategic culture as an ‘ideational milieu’ that 
governs the decisions of the EU states regarding the use of military force; embraced 
the issues of when, on what occasions, and in which situations military force is to be 
used as a political tool (Giegerich 2006); approached the European Security Strategy 
as a main manifestation of an emerging EU strategic culture (Martinsen 2011); and 
argued that a strategic culture was rising within the CSDP (Biava 2011).  
 
The implication of this body of research
1
 lies in the perspectives that it provides as 
background knowledge and a basis for investigation. These contributions are relevant 
because, thanks to their efforts, concepts and explanations of what strategic culture 
may entail have developed, whose involvement they have, directly or indirectly, 
assisted.  
 
The domestic level approach 
The domestic level approach hinges on the centrality of the member states and their 
national interests. The ‘domestic level’ can be deemed as that ‘domain’ within which 
policies are affected by the behaviour within a state. EU states are believed to be in 
continuous tension with external forces that originated beyond their borders. This 
approach lays emphasis on the linkage between the member state’s domestic sphere 
and the EU level of policies (which also involves its external policies).  
 
This approach’s central assumption is that any explanation of the CSDP which 
does not include the domestic dimension is essentially flawed. In other words, 
attention to the domestic element, characterising, on that occasion, the EU state’s 
contributor to the CSDP, is vital. The domestic level has an important function in 
determining whether the CSDP is an appropriate ‘process’ for responding to the 
national interests and goals (see Hill 1997, 11-12; Bulmer 1983, 351-2).     
 
The domestic level approach is strengthened by bureaucratic politics (Allison and 
Halperin 1972) because the latter agrees with the notion that an actor, such as a EU 
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state and its leaders, could make an ‘acceptable decision’ as far as the EU state and 
leaders’ national goals and objectives are concerned (see p. 41). The domestic level 
approach’s assumptions, therefore, encompass the view that the national and 
European leaders’ (i.e. policy-makers’) behaviour is particularly affected by the gains 
they may wish to obtain. 
 
This approach sees the CSDP as a process within which the EU member states 
have interacted among themselves and reacted to external and domestic inducements. 
By doing so, they generated a set of practices, stances and activities, including civil 
and military undertakings. This ‘quantity’ of measures, positions and operations could 
be reinforced or weakened. It would depend not only on the nature of the ‘external’ 
challenge (the Libyan crisis) but also on particular developments in the domestic 
arena of the member states. This volume of common procedures and actions is in a 
continued ‘variation’ contingent to the force of the member states to influence the 
response of the EU to an external event or crisis.  
  
Looking at the answers to the Libyan challenge through this approach, the national 
scenarios and power of the interests and goals therein will be revealed. Domestic 
considerations may estimate the value of the ‘rapidity’ of an action of national 
security. They might assess the conduct of the national political leaders involved in 
taking a decision on the CSDP. Domestic judgment may influence a vote regarding 
confirming or changing the leaders’ position in national politics.   
 
Developing the CSDP (and, also, by contrast, ignoring it) may also represent a 
particular interest of the national leaders. This is true also in relation to the EU’s 
deployment of military and civil forces. In this regard, France has often been 
discussed, by the other EU states and particularly Germany, for pursuing its national 
objectives (and also managing its domestic politics) at the EU level. It was spoken 
about for employing the CSDP’s deployment for the protection of France’s national 
responsibilities, especially in its African backyard (in Chad). Also, demonstrating 
European puissance through a ‘hyperactive’ CSDP (especially towards the US in 
connection with the EU’s ability to resolve regional crises) may respond to the 
national interests and goals, particularly at election time.  
 
On the whole, the assumptions of the domestic level approach are made potent by 
national and domestic considerations and their linkage to the CSDP tier. Economic 
gains, political rewards, and the specific task of expanding a party’s political basis are 
key elements. Particularly, reassuring the pressure groups and (business and 
industrial) lobbies about the ability to win a consensus, and preserve the power that 
the lobbies expect to hold are critical phenomena within this approach.  
 
The contribution of the literature  
Within the existing literature on this field, one work in particular identified the 
importance of the domestic level of policy-making in analysing the European 
Community’s policies (Bulmer 1983), and set up a framework ‘to explain how the 
domestic level may have a vital impact on the EC’s outputs’. Another study (Marks 
1996) sought to demonstrate that the government leaders are ‘usually decisive actors’ 
both in the domestic arena and in the European Union. An influential study (Putnam 
1988) examined ‘how’ and ‘when’ domestic politics and international relations 
somehow become entangled, and offered a theoretical approach to this issue. Several 
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works have engaged in exploring the domestic level of policy-making and 
interrelation with the external forces (Gourevitch 1978; Milner 1997; Smith, A. 1998; 
Fearon 1998), or preference formation and power in the European Community 
(Moravcsik 1993, 1994). Yet one work in particular (Bulmer 1983, see above) 
remains the established contribution concerned with dealing with the domestic level 
and the European structures.  
   
The political context of the crisis  
 
The succession of initiatives  
It is worth remembering that a few days after the crisis erupted in Libya, on 21 
February the 27 EU foreign ministers, reunited in the Council of the European Union 
in Brussels, requested an end to the violence. Shortly afterwards, France, Germany 
and The Netherlands proposed sanctions, whereas Malta, Cyprus and Italy, led by 
former Prime Minister Berlusconi, were unwilling to endorse the proposal. In late 
February, Britain’s Prime Minister Cameron declared that the United Kingdom was 
preparing to arrange a no fly zone, possibly under NATO’s coordination. France 
expressly stated that it was keen to use NATO’s military command to ‘plan and 
execute air operations’. However it strongly believed that the North Atlantic Alliance 
should take no political control of the overall military operation. This would have 
alienated the Arab countries (France 2011a).  
 
At the European Council meeting of 11 March, the EU states were addressed by 
France to recognise the Benghazi-based Transitional National Council (TNC), a 
recognition that France’s former President Sarkozy made unilaterally the previous day 
(EurActiv).
2
 Shortly afterwards, on 17 March, the UN Security Council approved the 
no-fly zone over Libya, and authorised all of the necessary measures to protect 
civilians (Resolution 1973). Sarkozy called a summit on Libya, in the French capital 
on 19 March, tasked with organising the political guidance of the operation authorised 
by the UN. It was agreed with America’s President Obama that the first offensive 
action would be conducted by the US. Also it was agreed that, after the US had 
nullified Libya’s air defence system, with what has been called Operation Odyssey 
Dawn, NATO would replace the American leadership. Such an arrangement was 
making clear that the direction was under non-USA authority (Howorth 2011, 18-19; 
Charlemagne 2011).  
 
On 20 March, French fighter jets opened fire on Gaddafi’s troops. The collective 
action which ensued, allowed by Resolution 1973, the Unified Protector Operation, 
was led by NATO. As the US withdrew, attacks on ground targets were undertaken 
by the French, British, Italian, Danish, Belgian, Canadian, Emirati, Qatari and 
Norwegian armies. 
 
The EU’s lack of a common response 
No military operation was aired, as one to be taken under the initiative of the CSDP 
within the European framework. Not that a discussion on the matter was eluded by the 
EU states. However, there was no sign of the ‘ambition in the field of military crisis 
management’ that some Swedish defence ministers had previously predicted for the 
EU (Engberg 2010, 408). Nor any indication emerged regarding the so-called ‘tarzan’ 
narrative, which the EU had constructed in the first decade of the twenty-first century 
(Flockhart 2011).  
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As late as 12 April, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg, a debate 
on whether the CSDP should intervene with armed forces occupied the agenda of the 
EU states. The meeting was held after the European Council, on 1 April, had agreed 
to the EUFOR Libya CSDP military mission.
3
 This one was anchored to the United 
Nation’s request to intervene in support of humanitarian assistance operations 
(Council Decision 011/210/CFSP). An operational plan was needed for the military 
humanitarian intervention. The discussion on that matter, in Luxemburg, unveiled the 
contrasting positions of the foreign ministers. In particular, the claim emerged that the 
UN retained access to Misrata, which was under siege by Gaddafi’s forces, and a EU 
military action would have jeopardised the UN endeavours. Also, the contention was 
advanced by the Italians that they could not understand the need for a military 
intervention to deliver humanitarian aid. The argument, outlined by others, that the 
deployment of forces was driven by a desire to demonstrate that the EU had a military 
planning capacity, distinct from that of NATO, was also aired. The indication that a 
military intervention was the only possible way to halt Gaddafi was, definitely, made. 
Concern about the time-consuming decision to agree on ‘when’ and ‘how’ to end the 
military mission was also reportedly evident at the meeting. Apparently, disagreement 
about the EU being divided among the ‘do-gooders’ and the ‘warriors’ was 
impossible to restrain. In the end, a high level UN aid-and-relief official’s letter to EU 
High Representative Ashton finally answered these objections. The letter disclosed 
the reservations about providing military support for a humanitarian mission (Vogel 
2011a).  
 
By contrast, a few days after the EU foreign ministers met in Luxemburg, France’s 
former President Sarkozy and Britain’s Prime Minister Cameron underwrote a letter, 
signed also by the US President Obama, which was published in the New York Times, 
declaring that ‘Gaddafi must go and go for good’ (New York Times 14 April 2011).  
 
How does the empirical discussion evaluate the evidence regarding the EU’s lack 
of a common response to the Libyan crisis in terms of the two approaches: the 
strategic culture perspective and the domestic level of observation?  
 
The empirical discussion: the strategic culture approach  
 
The key questions here are whether the strategic culture approach is suitable: i) for 
analysing the development of the CSDP, and ii) explaining the (possible) causes 
behind the EU’s lack of a common response through the CSDP. Two investigations 
follow.    
 
Strategic cultures’ general characters  
As for this approach, ‘convergence of strategic cultures’ of the EU member states was 
a condition for offering a EU/CSDP common response. To deal with this issue, this 
approach offered hints. Its assumptions were that ‘ideas, norms and patterns of 
behaviour, related to the processes concerning the European security and defence 
politics, which are satisfactorily shared at the national level (by political actors and 
society) are to be satisfactory shared at the EU level in order to offer convergence in 
the CSDP’.  
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Through applying this approach to Italy, France, Britain and Germany as a sample 
of the EU/27 to assess and compare their strategic culture ‘in general’, differences 
surfaced. 
 
The ideas led to several findings. The French (and their strategic thinking) were 
traditionally led by ideas of grandeur. Yet, even nowadays, they remained vitally tied 
to the general grandeur objective of their culture (Interview with a French public 
official, Rome and Lyon, May 2011).  The British had a self-perception as a great 
power. By contrast, the Italians, as the background feeding their strategic culture, still 
currently struggled with the need to preserve their national pride (Ferrara 2003), an 
attitude left over from the Second World War. They had no ideas of grandeur, like the 
French, nor a power perception, as the British still maintained.  
 
‘Ideas linked to patterns of behaviour’ produced other findings. The British found 
it essential to express a strong attachment to their own sovereignty, whereas the 
Italians encouraged ‘cooperative security’. In addition, the British, analogously to the 
French, traditionally employed armed forces and performed this as a foreign policy 
instrument along with civilian resources. As a key difference, both were less hesitant 
regarding this option than Italy. 
 
Also, attention to ‘norms and their impact on other states’ guided this article’s 
findings. By contrast with Britain and France, Italy’s culture perceived the need for a 
UN, or an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandate, 
before embarking on an operation that utilised the military. The general agreement 
that Italy had never held a seat on the UN Security Council, unlike France and Britain, 
contributed towards creating a sense that ‘something was missing’ in order to 
embrace a strategic culture worthy of the name (Interview with an Italian high-rank 
government and NATO official, Rome, September 2011).  
 
‘Similarity in strategic cultures’, and the ‘influence of ideas and norms’ on the 
state’s behaviour, produced new evidence. Italian strategic culture appeared similar to 
that of Germany, whereby the Germans perceived the need to submerge their nation-
state into the wider whole (Schmidt 2006). Also, the Germans felt uneasy about the 
combination of military and civilian tools, and in particular rejected force projection, 
favouring instead the use of civilian means. Besides the particular influences of the 
Prime Ministers, very peculiarly, Italian public opinion accepted only a specific 
‘Italian way of peacekeeping’, that removed any idea of combat (Interview with an 
Italian senior analyst from CeMISS, Military Centre for Strategic Studies, Rome, May 
2010). The ‘Italian way’ emphasised post-stabilisation aid, and reduced the function 
of the military to that of a Non-Governmental Organisation. Perhaps this particular 
character induced former Foreign Minister Frattini, at the EU meeting in Luxemburg 
debating on whether the CSDP should intervene with armed forces in Libya, to 
question the need for a military intervention in Libya to deliver humanitarian aid.  
 
These general characters concerning the strategic cultures of the EU member states 
(and societies) were powerful in motivating their policies. They were influential 
because the ideas conveyed the kind of image that the EU states – France, Britain, 
Italy and Germany – held about a nonviolent, stable world as well as how they 
foresaw their own wider responsibility therein. Norms expressed the nature of the 
domestic consensus on deployment for which the EU states, and their societies, had 
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opted, and the patterns of behaviour generated the consequent conduct. On the whole, 
these characters were also influential in shaping the possible convergence of the 
strategic cultures and policies of the EU states.   
 
With regard to this investigation of strategic cultures’ convergence on the CSDP, 
this approach’s contribution has proved relatively inadequate. Highlighting more 
differences than similarities among the general features defining the strategic culture 
of EU states would suggest that differences negatively impinge on a convergent 
position. The argument goes on to claim that there would be no development of the 
CSDP, but, despite the member states’ differences in strategic culture, they have 
marked up over 20 civil-military operations through the CSDP since 1998. All the 
more, albeit the gap between Italy, France and Britain’s notions of strategic culture, 
Italian forces also took part in over 20 international missions up to January 2012, 
including CSDP operations. Therefore, this approach does not appear appropriate for 
analysing the development of the CSDP.  
 
This calls for more evidence on the usability of the strategic culture approach, such 
as an explanation of the likely motivations for the missed common response from the 
EU/CSDP.  
 
Reaction to Libya  
As its assumptions include ‘political leaders/policy-makers’ and ‘society’ as actors, 
this approach makes it possible to examine their ‘response’ regarding European 
security and defence politics. What was the reaction to Libya by societies and policy-
makers, at the time of the crisis?  
 
Society in Britain was more prone to repatriate their share of policy from Brussels 
than to tie in with the CSDP and its military (Financial Times 21 May 2012). Concern 
about becoming embroiled in excessive bureaucracy and, perhaps on occasions, being 
obliged to depend on the policies and choices made by others (Interview with a senior 
British official, London, November 2012) did not favour a friendly vision of the 
CSDP, even with regard to Libya.  
 
Society in France was largely behind Sarkozy’s military initiative, with Parliament 
accepting the notion of a new era in the Mediterranean, and not rejecting Sarkozy’s 
assertive role under the claim of further action in the CSDP (France 2011b). If 
questioned about the feasibility of a CSDP accomplishment in Libya, the French 
would respond that, above all, rapidity of action was important (Interview with a 
French public official, Rome and Lyon, May 2011).  
 
In Italy, society was, above all concerned with Berlusconi’s tardy reaction rather 
than with deserting the CSDP. However, when political observers were interviewed 
by the Italian national broadcaster, La7, soon after the crisis developed, reference to 
the ‘existence of a process to be put into motion especially in these occasions’, the 
CSDP, was made. To others, the fact that ‘European nations’ conducted the military 
intervention was, by itself, a synonym for European unity. They rejected any 
preoccupation for bypassing the CSDP (Interview with an Italian political scientist, 
RomaTre University, Rome, October 2011).  
 
 10 
Society in Germany questioned the government’s non-alignment with its 
traditional allies rather than its weak attachment to the CSDP as a civil-military actor 
(Das Spiegel 18 March 2011). Yet, the usual emphasis, expressed in Berlin’s 
Bundestag on ‘non-attachment to the military CSDP’, also concerning the case of 
Libya, was downplayed as an approach which performed well with a certain 
electorate (Interview with a German security analyst, Cardiff and Oxford, March 
2013).  
 
Also, the attitude of EU HR Ashton, of making no effort to enhance the reputation 
of the CSDP to challenge authoritarian Libya, had not helped societies to generate 
support, and make the EU/CSDP more influential. Her assertion, at the Corvinus 
University (February 2011), that the strength of the EU lay (paradoxically) in its 
inability to throw its weight around was a sign that Ashton wished to distance herself 
from a CSDP military mission (Corvinus).  
 
With regard to this second investigation, it is true that this approach gave 
indications of the member states’ (society and policy-makers) reactions to the Libyan 
crisis concerning the CSDP, but its ability to shed light on the causes of these 
reactions seems insufficient. This approach has not been shown ‘to hold the power’ to 
offer a ‘thorough explanation’ of the likely reasons behind the EU/CSDP’s missed 
common response.  
 
The approach’s limitations  
There are flaws and limitations to the strategic culture approach which the empirical 
evidence revealed.  
 
In its assumptions, which we have just revisited, there was no advantage to 
explaining the ‘convergence of strategic cultures’. Three orders of factors support 
this.  
 
Firstly, in relation to the EU states, the situation of those states that responded 
differently, as discussed in the sample of the four member states, to external threats or 
pressure for merging strategic cultures does not encourage the view that convergence 
was certain.
4
 Secondly, concerning this approach’s indication that strong national and 
European leadership is needed in order to attain a common strategic culture at the EU 
level, this condition is useful, but by itself does not assure convergence. Neither 
Sarkozy’s assertive role nor EU HR Ashton’s behaviour served the cause of 
convergence in the CSDP. Thirdly, regarding the European Union, the reactivity to 
the crises is conditioned by the fact that the EU’s strategic culture vis-à-vis the 
military is rooted in deployment based on a mandate, limited in time and space, and 
foreseeing an exit strategy.
5
 Agreeing and formalising all of this contrasts with the 
rapidity needed on these occasions. This problem was discussed at the meeting in 
Luxemburg.  
 
Again, on the issue of strategic cultures’ convergence in the CSDP, neither the first 
nor the second investigation found evidence that this approach offers suggestions 
regarding a ‘stable condition of strategic culture’ as a foundation for the CSDP, or a 
‘progressing degree of convergence’. Even more strikingly, the investigation found no 
evidence of a ‘collective strategic culture’, as a common platform for the CSDP, with 
the understanding that there is a joint responsibility to face external threats. This 
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article warns about the risk of employing the strategic culture framework to explain 
the development of the CSDP.  
 
The fluidity and volatility of the convergence process can be seen in the political 
opposition (from Berlin, London and Paris) that was not overcome (October 2012), 
when the convergence of strategic cultures on pooling and sharing was required for 
the merger of an integrated European aerospace construct and defence group (EADS-
BAE). Convergence was taken hostage by the political leaders of the EU states and 
their politics. If the national interests and politics of the member states and their 
leaders were at stake when convergence was an option, the national level might be 
more appropriate than the strategic culture perspective to examine developments 
concerning the CSDP.  
 
The empirical discussion: the domestic level approach  
 
Is the domestic level approach more appropriate for considering the strong national 
and European leadership needed for convergence in the CSDP, which the previous 
discussion judged an insufficient condition to guarantee the development of the 
CSDP?  
 
The domestic level’s assumptions specified that the ‘national and European 
leaders’’ (i.e. policy-makers’) behaviour is particularly affected by the gains they may 
wish to obtain’. Re-interpreting the strategic culture assumption through the domestic 
level approach (and keeping an eye on the gains that could attract the ‘leaders’), this 
article concentrated on their behaviour, specifically their conduct in response to the 
crisis, in terms of supporting a CSDP civil-military operation. This investigation 
found the following evidence.  
 
In France, former President Sarkozy’s personal standing was at stake in view of the 
relatively soon national contest for the presidency (April 2012). France generally held 
the initiative within the CSDP, inspired by Europe de la defence ideas. On this 
occasion, Sarkozy may have wished to avoid suppressing France’s own interests and 
influence in Africa in the pursuit of a minimal European consensus (Haine 2011a, 14). 
On previous occasions, France had already experienced the extent to which the CSDP 
lacked promptness of action. Regarding Chad, it had to make efforts to convince the 
other member states to participate in the EU’s operation (Haine 2011b, 594). The 
project for an integrated Mediterranean area had been the focus of Sarkozy’s attention 
since 2008, reviving the idea of a Union of the Mediterranean. In March 2011, during 
the Libyan crisis, the then Prime Minister Fillon claimed, in the French Parliament, 
that ‘France want[ed] to see a new era in the Mediterranean region’ (France 2011a). 
Sarkozy had already wasted time, and lost the opportunity for initiatives, during the 
previous challenge of the Tunisian unrest. His failure to respond to that crisis already 
overloaded his government with the dismissal of the Foreign Minister. He needed 
rapidity of action, and the CSDP was not congenial towards Sarkozy’s decision to 
oppose violence in Libya.   
 
In Britain, Prime Minister Cameron’s decreasing domestic consensus on the 
uneasy handling of his coalition government challenged his position and reputation. 
Much of Cameron’s efforts were aimed at raising his standing by reinforcing his 
party. Perhaps Blair, the former British Prime Minister, would have sought an 
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initiative by his country in Europe, leading the CSDP to calm the violence in Libya, 
believing it to be a positive asset. Through his attempts to broaden his political basis, 
however, Cameron reignited Britain’s European political controversies. The promise 
of an in-out referendum on Europe, in 2017, if the Conservatives win the next general 
election had been aired as manifesto. Cameron could inconceivably be the promoter 
of a security operation in Libya within the CSDP. Yet, he was ready to intervene in 
Libya, even without a UN resolution.
6
 The then European Security and Defence 
Policy was never mentioned in Britain’s 2010 national security strategy document 
and, soon after his election in May 2010, Cameron signed with Sarkozy a British 
defensive treaty with France, in November 2010. On that occasion, Britain’s Prime 
Minister indicated that, through that agreement, the two leaders could ‘do more things 
alone as well as together’ (The Guardian 2010). By using the management of the 
Libyan crisis as an occasion for the joint operational and political leadership of these 
two states (Benitez 2011) instead of passing it to the EU, Cameron aimed to increase 
his reputation at home.  
 
In Germany, not very differently from her European counterparts, Chancellor 
Merkel was concerned about not jeopardising her position within the party. Becoming 
involved in any process backing deployment was raising the question of how the 
electorate would react to it, in the upcoming elections, in some states (18 September 
2011). The Chancellor also faced parliamentarian opposition to her plans for the 
European Financial Stability Facility (Das Spiegel 26 August 2011). Her party’s 
power was expected to be eroded. Merkel could not sponsor the CSDP to play a role 
in Libya. Apparently, the German ‘ontological’ problems with security countered the 
‘military connection’. This position was, however, paradoxical. As an opinion poll 
conducted on 22 June 2011 in EU countries and the US revealed, Germany was the 
first after the primacy of France to underwrite the military operation which actually 
took place (Menotti 2011). A paradox was also the much-talked abstention, on 17 
March, from UNSC Resolution 1973 imposing the no-fly zone, which the EU also 
supported. Convinced human rights champion Chancellor Merkel aligned Germany 
with Russia and China, unquestionably no great human rights supporters. These 
paradoxes and the inability to compromise show that concessions, including 
championing the CSDP, were endangering Merkel’s domestic position.  
 
Also for Italy, the found evidence has not diverged from the kind of reasons, and 
personal preoccupations, behind the other EU leaders’ behaviour in response to the 
crisis. Former Prime Minister Berlusconi focused on avoiding, as far as possible, the 
disastrous personal impact that the situation in Libya was threatening to generate. His 
party and government had several consequences of the crisis to face. The 
development of a EU/CSDP operation was not the focus. In 2008, Berlusconi had 
agreed with Tripoli a friendship and cooperation treaty. The commitment that Italy 
would not consent to the use of its territory for any ‘hostile act’ (or engage in ‘direct 
or indirect’ military action) against Libya was made. The former prime minister 
feared that this would have a negative impact on many Italian companies, which were 
partly owned by the Libyan government (e.g. FIAT SpA and UniCredit SpA). The 
Italian national energy corporation, Eni SpA, had been active for more than fifty years 
in Libya. More than 1,300 Italian workers had to be rescued from that country prior to 
any military action being taken (Italian Government 24 March 2011, p. 20). 
Berlusconi was concerned about the flow of Libyan migrants into Italy that, together 
with other problems, would damage his political party’s foundation. In addition, a 
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quarter of Italy’s crude oil requirements where being supplied by Libya. This was a 
further motive confirming that any reference to military CSDP activity in Libya was 
far from what Berlusconi wanted.  
 
In the European Union, High Representative Ashton unveiled no aspiration to 
support CSDP military interference in Libya. Ashton was apparently obsessed with 
the problem of the ‘reality of 27 member states who are sovereign, who believe 
passionately in their own right to determine what they do, particularly in the area of 
defence’ (DawnComWorld 2011). At the European Council emergency meeting of 11 
March 2011, the HR’s views prevailed when the EU leaders signed a communiqué 
that omitted any mention of the no-fly zone that was keenly sponsored by France and 
Britain. The communiqué sparked a furious debate. In London, ‘should [Baroness 
Ashton] not serve the member states of the European Union rather than pretending to 
lead them?’ was the prevalent MPs’ accusation, which engaged Prime Minister 
Cameron in a defensive debate in the Commons (The Guardian, 15 March 2011). 
Ashton was influenced, if not taken hostage, by the politics of Britain and France, 
with Cameron and Sarkozy covertly instructing her not to interfere in the military 
decision-making (Interview with an EEAS official, Brussels, November 2012).  
 
Yet, the strength of the domestic level approach, in the context of this discussion, 
is demonstrated by overcoming shortcomings of the strategic culture analysis. The 
exercise of re-interpreting the strategic culture assumption in the light of the domestic 
level assessments proved beneficial. By adjusting its focus to the advantages that the 
leaders/policy-makers may have sought to obtain through their action, the domestic 
level analysis was more skilled than the strategic culture in explaining why the CSDP 
was not favoured, in the event of responding to the crisis. It highlighted the relevance 
of the rewards and benefits at which the policy-makers may have aimed, that the latter 
approach could not perceive as the influential factors motivating the (non-
)development of the CSDP. It lay emphasis on domestic interests, burdens and 
pressures, as forces which impacted on the CSDP and its growth. It stressed that the 
fear of losing the acquired power in the domestic political context, or politically 
damaging their reputation (EU HR Ashton), were among the motives justifying the 
policy-makers’ behaviour, and the refusal of the CSDP. Hence, in terms of the 
probable reasons for the EU’s missed military intervention, this approach performed 
better that the strategic culture analysis.  
 
The domestic level perspective performed better also in relation to examining the 
development of the CSDP. As far as this perspective is concerned, the CSDP was 
prey to the member states and their desires. This approach’s definition of the present 
‘state’ of the CSDP is that of an on-going process, in ‘continued variation’, within 
which ‘convergence’ is a process that has not been concluded, is still developing, and 
could supposedly cease and be reversed too.  
 
Concluding comments  
The view of the CSDP being prey to the member states’ wants, and risking extinction, 
leads analysts to ‘wonder’ about its future. It leads this article to reflect on ‘certain 
missed opportunities’. Four observations seek to demonstrate that the neglected 
opportunities would have been (and remain) an option for the future development of 
the CSDP.  
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First, the defence of European interests in the region. In 2010, Libya was the sixth 
major energy provider to the EU, fulfilling 17 per cent of European energy 
requirements. The EU framed no common energy policy, and so the member states 
were compelled to make direct acquisitions on an individual basis. In 2010 also, 
France was a strong importer (205,000 oil barrels per day) and also Germany and 
Spain (respectively 144.000 b/d and 136,000 b/d), and Italy was, by far, the biggest 
buyer (376,000 b/d). For Britain, the reduced availability of energy resources in the 
North Sea, in addition to the desire to lessen its reliance on Russian Gazprom, had 
served to strengthen its energy dealings with Libya (95,000 b/d in 2010) (The 
Economist 2011; Caspian Weekly 2011). Along with the strategic aim of fostering 
stability in the neighbourhood (Schroeder 2009, 501), the protection of a key region 
for European wellbeing concerning the security of energy sources, maritime security, 
and sea commercial lanes as well as migration control, was a logical task for the 
CSDP policy to undertake.  
 
Second, the promotion of a CSDP operation formed by those who were willing to 
take action. Officially, the choices made within this area conform to the norm of 
unanimity, namely the 27 Foreign Ministers need to agree within the Foreign Affairs 
Council. In situations of particular importance, the Heads of State and Government 
united in the European Council have the right of decision, and individual member 
states hold a veto over any joint choice. On that occasion, the member states and the 
EU could make an effort, and bridge the gap between the willing to intervene in the 
crisis management and those less interested in doing so. They could give support to 
the shaping of a CSDP military operation formed by the ‘keen to intervene states’.   
 
Third, taking the political control and strategic direction of the NATO military 
operation if Berlin-Plus had been used. Not possessing the necessary military 
capabilities was watched with ‘anxiety’ on the other side of the Atlantic and branded 
by some as ‘the European culture of demilitarization’ (Gates 2010). This hurdle was 
nonetheless lowered by the US granting assistance and support in the light of the lack 
of aircraft carriers, smart munitions and enablers of modern warfare, surveillance and 
air tanking (Witney 2011, 2). The kind of setting of a Europe-led NATO command 
configuration was not new. It was defined, in the 1990s, as the European Security and 
Defence Identity, namely a NATO mission, conducted by the Europeans operating 
through US military resources. It was surpassed, in 2002, by the Berlin Plus 
arrangement, which allowed the CSDP to use NATO (i.e. US) assets to handle an 
operation without the involvement of US forces (Howorth 2011, 19; 2007, 99-102). 
The Berlin Plus mechanisms were successfully used in Operation Concordia in 
Macedonia, in 2003 (Mace 2004; Abele 2003). They were indeed offering a more 
‘European’ option to mark the operation in Libya. Specifically, even though the 
military action was implemented under NATO command, the member states’ choice 
to resort to the Berlin-Plus procedures would have allowed the CSDP to take strategic 
control of the military action.  
 
There was also a stringent logic in support of this alternative. The EU was 
involved in making long-term policies in the region aimed at nurturing stability in its 
neighbouring belt. The EU was, by intention, well disposed towards eventually 
developing a comprehensive relationship with Libya. It was willing to offer a 
framework agreement, finally including Libya’s participation in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (Biscop 2011, 2; Bosse 2011, 442).  
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Fourth, the Union and the member states had estimated that they were willing, as a 
group or part of it, to perform disarmament operations and rescue missions through 
the CSDP (Lisbon Treaty Art. 43). By contrast, as a result of their choices, the 
Responsibility to Protect People (R2P) was also among the overlooked charges. This 
was a paradox at least for two reasons. Firstly, the member states made efforts, and 
succeeded in having the R2P recognised as a responsibility of the international 
community, at the 2005 World Summit. Secondly, they incorporated it within the 
EU’s own security strategy priority tasks.   
 
If the future of the CSDP were in the member states’ interests, in the event of the 
Libyan crisis the EU’s common response might have followed this other alternative:  
 
a EU military operation made up by the ‘willing to intervene EU states’, under the political control 
and strategic direction of the CSDP (thanks to Berlin-Plus), in defence of the R2P obligation, and of 
the many European security interests in the region. 
 
On the whole, this article sought to demonstrate the limitations of the strategic 
culture approach in observing and explaining the EU’s lack of a common response to 
the Libyan crisis, which would have involved the development of the CSDP, and to 
demonstrate that the domestic level approach has greater explanatory power. By 
describing the flaws of the strategic culture perspective to explain the ‘convergence of 
member states’ strategic cultures at the EU level’, and therefore in the CSDP, this 
article warns of the danger of using this approach to analyse the CSDP. By 
highlighting the ‘consideration’ that the behaviour of the national and European 
leaders/policy-makers is mostly influenced by the advantages that they believe it is 
possible to obtain via their action, this article enhanced the key assumption of the 
domestic level approach.  
 
The findings concerning the EU’s lack of a common response to the Libyan crisis 
cannot be generalized. Emergency situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
have been approached by the EU/CSDP with integrated civil-military efforts. 
However, the more recent developments in Mali have not seen the launch of a CSDP 
civil-military mission either.
7
 The management of that crisis was a French unilateral 
initiative. This would suggest that the EU’s answer to the Libya challenge is not a 
‘one-off’ response. The EU’s lack of a response to Mali may be interpreted, in the 
context of this paper, by the view that the influence of the EU structures is eroded by 
the effect of the ‘nationalism’ of the member states. The unwillingness to sponsor 
joint actions within the EU framework is a growing trend. The common security and 
defence policy is in a state of flux. Perhaps there will be better occasions. The whole, 
however, throws a shadow across the future of the CSDP.  
 
    Notes  
                                                        
1
 There is no space for further references still relevant, such as the accounts of strategic culture by 
Johnston (1995, 1999) and Gray (1999), and other contributions: Rynning (2003) investigated the 
‘likelihood’ that EU member states develop a strategic culture embracing ‘common interests and views 
of the world’. Hyde-Price (2004) warned about the risk that the European strategic culture reproduces 
old scenarios and inhibits the development of new European security strategies relevant to our time. 
Matlary (2006) discussed the concept of human security as the possible foundation for a new type of 
European strategic culture.  
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2
 On 14 March, France and Britain were working on a draft resolution, supporting a NFZ, with 
Cameron hinting that ‘he might consider action without a UN mandate’.  
3
 The Operational Headquarters were in Rome and an Italian rear admiral was nominated as the EU 
Operational Commander.  
4
 Meyer (2004, 20) concedes that ‘convergence is not an inevitable phenomenon’.  
5
 See: Marchi 2011; Biava 2011.  
6
 See: Gowan, R. and Brantner, F. (2011), ‘The EU and Human Rights at the UN:  2011 Review’, 
ecfr.eu Policy Memo, 4.  
7
 The EU was present only in terms of training and reorganising the Malian armed forces (EUTM 
Mali).  
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